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The events of the Arab Uprisings posed an existential challenge to sovereign power across the Middle East. Whilst popular movements resulted in the toppling of authoritarian rule in Tunisia, Egypt and Yemen, other regimes were able to withstand these pressures. This book questions why some regimes fell whilst others were able to survive. Drawing on the work of political theorists such as Agamben and Arendt, Mabon explores the ways in which sovereign power is contested, resulting in the fragmentation of political projects across the region. Combining an innovative theoretical approach with interviews with people across the region and beyond, Mabon paints a picture of Middle Eastern politics dominated by elites seeking to maintain power and wealth, seemingly at whatever cost. This, for Mabon, is a consequence of the emergence and development of particular visions of political projects that harness or marginalise identities, communities, ideologies and faiths as mechanisms designed to ensure their survival. This book is essential reading for those interested in understanding why the uprisings took place, their geopolitical consequences, and why they are likely to happen again.

The events of the Arab Uprisings posed an existential challenge to sovereign power across the Middle East. Whilst popular movements resulted in the toppling of authoritarian rule in Tunisia, Egypt and Yemen, other regimes were able to withstand these pressures. This book questions why some regimes fell whilst others were able to survive.

Drawing on the work of political theorists such as Agamben and Arendt, Mabon explores the ways in which sovereign power is contested, resulting in the fragmentation of political projects across the region. Combining an innovative theoretical approach with interviews with people across the region and beyond, Mabon paints a picture of Middle Eastern politics dominated by elites seeking to maintain power and wealth, seemingly at whatever cost. This, for Mabon, is a consequence of the emergence and development of particular visions of political projects that harness or marginalise identities, communities, ideologies and faiths as mechanisms designed to ensure their survival.

This book is essential reading for those interested in understanding why the uprisings took place, their geopolitical consequences, and why they are likely to happen again.

« In the wake of the 1979 Iranian revolution, relations between states in the Middle East were reconfigured and reassessed overnight. Amongst the most-affected was the relationship between Iran and Saudi Arabia. The existence of a new regime in Tehran led to increasingly vitriolic confrontations between these two states, often manifesting themselves in the conflicts across the region, such as those in Lebanon and Iraq, and more recently in Bahrain and Syria.In this new and revised second edition, Simon Mabon examines the different identity groups within Saudi Arabia and Iran (made up of various religions, ethnicities and tribal groupings), proposing that internal insecurity has an enormous impact on the wider ideological and geopolitical competition between the two. With analysis of this heated and often uneasy relationship and its impact on the wider Middle East, this book is vital for those researching international relations and diplomacy in the region. « (Verlagsbeschreibung)

On 14 February 2011 Bahrainis took to the streets demanding political reform as part of a broader wave of protests that swept across the Arab world. In the months that followed, the ruling Al-Khalifa family deployed mechanisms of sovereign power in an effort to ensure the survival of the regime. This article explores counter-revolutionary efforts deployed by the Bahraini state in an effort to eviscerate protest movements born out of the Arab Uprisings. Drawing on Giorgio Agamben's ideas about sovereign power, I argue that the Al-Khalifa regime was able to deploy a range of different tools in pursuit of survival, framing Shi'a groups as nefarious fifth columnists operating within a broader regional struggle pitting Saudi Arabia and Iran against one another. The article argues that while sect-based difference is an important aspect of contemporary Bahraini politics – facilitated by securitisation processes led by the Al-Khalifa – counter-revolutionary efforts have their roots in a state building project that gave the ruling family the ability to ensure their survival. This approach created an "anti-revolutionary" environment which prevented the emergence of widespread protest, yet when faced with serious challenges, anti-revolutionary processes morphed into counter-revolutionary mechanisms.

Over the past decade, regional politics across the Persian Gulf - and within the GCC in particular - has increasingly been characterised by suspicion and mutual distrust. Predominantly appearing in the guise of tensions between the Arab side of the Gulf on the west and the Iranian side on the east - divisions which are exacerbated by ethnicity, religion, economics, geopolitics, demographics, and geography - are coupled with intra-Arab and intra-GCC tensions about the nature of regional order. Yet at times of crisis, as Michael Barnett (1998) astutely observed, opportunities emerge to reshape the nature of relations. In what follows I reflect on Barnett's Constructivist take to explore the nature of Persian Gulf politics at a regional level. Other contributors to this special issue take a deeper dive into the intricacies of political, social, economic, governance and human rights concerns and, as such, I will largely steer clear of such observations. Instead, I will engage in a broader set of reflections about the nature of regional order and the impact of the pandemic on changing order.

AbstractIn this short intervention I explore the scope for power‐sharing as a means of resolving conflict between rulers and ruled across Bahrain. Unlike other states in the Middle East where power‐sharing has been posited as a solution to violence and division, conflict in Bahrain is structural, erupting in violence sporadically, yet framed around ways of ensuring the survival of the ruling Al Khalifa family. This, I argue, poses challenges to the application of traditional power‐sharing approaches that have been deployed elsewhere. In spite of this, power‐sharing continues to be viewed by many opposition figures as a viable means through which peace can be realized between the regime and opposition figures. Such moves are seen by many Bahrainis to be a means through which equality and a vibrant form of citizenship can be realized. I examine and reflect on three moments of political possibility in Bahrain: 1973–75, 2000–02, and the 2011 Arab uprisings. I argue that while power‐sharing appears to offer a means through which to address tensions within divided societies, power asymmetries across the state mean that the Al Khalifa face little pressure to adopt this approach, choosing instead to exert sovereign power over social divisions with support from external backers.

The events of the Arab Uprisings posed an existential challenge to sovereign power across the Middle East. Whilst popular movements resulted in the toppling of authoritarian rule in Tunisia, Egypt and Yemen, other regimes were able to withstand these pressures. This book questions why some regimes fell whilst others were able to survive. Drawing on the work of political theorists such as Agamben and Arendt, Mabon explores the ways in which sovereign power is contested, resulting in the fragmentation of political projects across the region. Combining an innovative theoretical approach with interviews with people across the region and beyond, Mabon paints a picture of Middle Eastern politics dominated by elites seeking to maintain power and wealth, seemingly at whatever cost. This, for Mabon, is a consequence of the emergence and development of particular visions of political projects that harness or marginalise identities, communities, ideologies and faiths as mechanisms designed to ensure their survival. This book is essential reading for those interested in understanding why the uprisings took place, their geopolitical consequences, and why they are likely to happen again.

In this short intervention I explore the scope for power‐sharing as a means of resolving conflict between rulers and ruled across Bahrain. Unlike other states in the Middle East where power‐sharing has been posited as a solution to violence and division, conflict in Bahrain is structural, erupting in violence sporadically, yet framed around ways of ensuring the survival of the ruling Al Khalifa family. This, I argue, poses challenges to the application of traditional power‐sharing approaches that have been deployed elsewhere. In spite of this, power‐sharing continues to be viewed by many opposition figures as a viable means through which peace can be realized between the regime and opposition figures. Such moves are seen by many Bahrainis to be a means through which equality and a vibrant form of citizenship can be realized. I examine and reflect on three moments of political possibility in Bahrain: 1973–75, 2000–02, and the 2011 Arab uprisings. I argue that while power‐sharing appears to offer a means through which to address tensions within divided societies, power asymmetries across the state mean that the Al Khalifa face little pressure to adopt this approach, choosing instead to exert sovereign power over social divisions with support from external backers.

AbstractTraditional approaches to questions aboutnomosin IR typically focus upon either its establishment and the formal structures that emerge through interaction within a clearly delineated spatial area, or an exploration of US hegemony in the post-2003 world. In this article I posit a different approach, building on the ideas of Giorgio Agamben, which groundsnomosas a spatialisation of the exception within conditions of neoliberal modernity. I suggest that within the globalnomosare more localisednomoi. These localisednomoiare a consequence of the spatialisation of the exception and a fundamental tension between localisation and ordering. I argue that while sovereign power has been a source of contemporary scholarship, such explorations have paid scant attention to the regulatory power of normative values and their capacity to create order within space. Such norms allow for a greater awareness of how sovereign power can be mobilised in and of itself as a form of contestation. Locating such debates in the Middle East, I explore the concept ofnomosto understand how struggle over the localisation and ordering of space helps us to better understand contemporary political life.

Traditional approaches to questions about nomos in IR typically focus upon either its establishment and the formal structures that emerge through interaction within a clearly delineated spatial area, or an exploration of US hegemony in the post-2003 world. In this article I posit a different approach, building on the ideas of Giorgio Agamben, which grounds nomos as a spatialisation of the exception within conditions of neoliberal modernity. I suggest that within the global nomos are more localised nomoi. These localised nomoi are a consequence of the spatialisation of the exception and a fundamental tension between localisation and ordering. I argue that while sovereign power has been a source of contemporary scholarship, such explorations have paid scant attention to the regulatory power of normative values and their capacity to create order within space. Such norms allow for a greater awareness of how sovereign power can be mobilised in and of itself as a form of contestation. Locating such debates in the Middle East, I explore the concept of nomos to understand how struggle over the localisation and ordering of space helps us to better understand contemporary political life.

Violent fragmentation in the Middle East has often been reduced to a consequence of "ancient hatreds" that pit Sunni against Shi'a. One of the more compelling arguments to understand the emergence of sectarian violence was proposed by Nader Hashemi and Danny Postel who suggest that the politics of the Middle East has undergone a process of sectarianization. This article builds upon the work of Hashemi and Postel to consider potential mechanisms to challenge this process of sectarianization, to work towards desectarianization. Drawing on interviews conducted across the Middle East and on a number of different disciplines, the article proposes a four-stage framework to facilitate desectarianization.

Amidst violent contestation across the Middle East leaving regimes facing – or fearing – popular protests, the regulation of political life became increasingly important. Across the past century, the development of political projects has been driven by regime efforts to maintain power, constructing regime-society relations in such a way to ensure their survival. As a consequence, security is not given; rather, it reflects the concerns of elites and embeds their concerns within society, using a range of domestic, regional and geopolitical strategies to meet their needs. These strategies play on a range of different fears and currents to locate regime interests within broader concerns. A key part of such efforts involves the cultivation and suppression of particular identities, often resulting in contestation and uncertainty within and between states. Drawing on the ideas of Giorgio Agamben, Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, the article argues that the regulation of sect-based identities – and difference – has been a key part of governance strategies in divided societies across the Middle East, albeit varying across time and space.